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BARTLES'S PETITION.
In 1849, a farm was given to an executor to pay the rents and profits thereof to
testator's daughter for life, and the farm itself was given, after her decease, " to
such person or persons as shall be her heir or heirs at law of land held by her in fee
simple." Under the statute, the farm was sold in 1868, and the proceeds invested
under the direction of the court. In 1880, the daughter released all her interest in
the fund to her children, who thereupon petitioned for its payment to them. Held,
that the will fixes the daughter's decease as the period for ascertaining who are her
heirs, and her children now living, being only heirs apparent, are therefore not
entitled to the fund.

ON petition by Theodore Bartles and others for paymient to
them of a trust fund under the control of this court.
RUNYON, Chancellor.-The petitioners are the children of
Phabe Ann Bartles. Her father, now deceased, by his will,
proved in 1849, gave to his executor his homestead farm in Morris
county during her life, in trust to rent it and receive the rents and
profits and pay them over as he should receive them to her for her
separate use, and to keep the property clear of all incumbrance by
her or on her account, or by or on account of her then or any
future husband, and he gave and devised the farm after her decease
to "such person or persons as" should "be her heir or heirs at
law of land held by her in fee simple." ' The farm was sold by
order of this court in 1868, under the act to authorize the sale of
land limited over to infants or in contingency (Rev. 1052), and
the net proceeds of sale were paid into this court and invested
under its direction according to the provisions of that act. Mrs.
Bartles is still living, but has released her right and interest to
and in the fund to the petitioners, who are all of her children, and
they apply for the fund, on the ground that having extinguished
her life estate, they are entitled to the money. That they are not
so is entirely clear. The remainder in fee is given at the death of
the life-tenant to "such person or persons as shall be her heir or
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heirs at law of land held by her in fee-simple," that is, to those
who by law would inherit the property at her death if she died
intestate seised thereof in fee. Who those persons will be cannot
She has heirs
now be determined. Nemo eat haere8 viventi.
apparent and presumptive now, but whether those persons will be
her heirs at her death and so entitled to the remainder, cannot be
told until that time arrives. The testator manifestly did not refer
to any particular individual or individuals or class of existing persons by the language which he employed; but used the word
"heir" in the technical sense, as is particularly evident from his
use of the future tense, "such person or persons as shall be her
heir or heirs at law," &c., that is, such person or persons as shall
be her heir or heirs at law when she dies. The petition must be
dismissed.
Under nemo est haeres virentis, a testamentary gift to the heirs of A., during
A.'s lititime, is void: 3 Greenl. Cruise
* 10b,

317 ; 2 Jarm. on Wills * 13 et

se.;
Otis v. Prince, 10 Gray 582;
Stith v. Barnes, 1 Law Repos. (N. C.)
484; Chessun v. Smith, 2 Id. 392; A'or-1,; v. Iensley, 27 Cal. 439, 450 ; Campbell v. Rowdon, 18 N. Y. 412, 416.
But if A. be referred to in the will as
a living person, a gift to his heirs is
valid: James v. Richardson, 1 Ventr.
334; Goodright v. Wlrhite, 2 W. BI.
1010; Vinter v. Perratt,5 B. & C. 48;
Came v. Roch, 7 Bing. 226; Darbison
v. Beaumont, I P. Wins. 229; Vannorsdall v. Deventer, 51 Barb. 137; Heard
v. 1[orton, I Denio 165; Cushman v.
Horton, 59 N. Y. 149 ; Cosbey v. Lee,
2 Disn. 460; Jourdan v. Green, 1 Dev.
Eq. 270; Levitt v. Wood, 17 Grant's
Ch. 414 ; Knight v. Knight, 3 Jones Eq.
167 ; Simms v. Garrott, I Dev. & Bat.
Eq. 393 ; Wardv. Stow, 2 Dev. Eq. 509 ;
Stith v. Barnes, 1 Law Repos. (N. C.)
484 ; or in case the term heirs is evidently
used as designatio personarum: Sams v.
Garlick, 14 M. & W. 698; Baker v.
Tucker, 3 H. of L. Cas. 106; Rittson
v. Stordy, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 771 ; Leev.
Foard, I Jones Eq. 125; Wood v.

McGuire, 15 Ga. 202 ; Jamison v. Hay,
46 Mo. 546; Bowers v. Porter, 4 Pick.
198; Johnson v. lWdton, 118 Mass. 340 ;
Morton v. Barrett, 22 Mo. 257; Witliamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 370;
Rapp v. Maitthias, 35 Ind. 332; Butler
v. Ileustis, 68 Ill. 594 ; Bailey v. Patterson, 3 Rich. Eq. 156; Caulk v. Fox, 13
Fla. 148, 161 ; Mare v. Richardson, 3
Md. 505; Roberts v. Ogbourne, 37 Ala.
174; M1yers v. Anderson, 1 Strobh. Eq.
344 ; so where the term heirsis qualified,
as heirs of the body, right heirs, 4-c.:
Niqhtingale v. Nightingale, 1 T. R. 630;
Sweet v. Herring, I East 264; Darbison
v. Beaumont, 3 Bro. P. C. 60; Doe v.
Lanning, 2 Burr. 1100; Tucker v. Adams,
14 Ga. 548; Sharman v. Jackson, 30 Id.
224 ; Tipton v. La Rose, 27 Ind. 484;
Grout v. Townsend, 2 I1ill 554; Bradford v. Howell, 42 Ala. 422; L-nacks
v. Glover, 1 Rich. Eq. 141. It cannot
be shown by parol that, by a devise to a
parent, who testator knows was dead, he
intended the children of such parent to
take: Judy v. Williams, 2 Ind. 449;
Cureton v. .Iassey, 13 Rich. Eq. 104.
The grantee in a deed must be in existence and certain, therefore a grant to
a dead man is void: Hunter v. Watson,
12 Cal. 363; McCracken v. Beal, 3 A.
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K. Marsh. 208; Galloway v. Rrney, 12
Pet. 264. See Crozier v. Crozier, 5
Irish Eq. 544; Holden v. Spnallbrooke,
Vaughn 199 ; Jackson v. Collins, 16 B.
Mon. 221 ; or to a fictitious person:
Thomas v. Wyatt, 25 Mo. 24 ; 31 Mo.
188; Phelps v. Call, 7 Ired. 262; Muskingum Co. v. Ward, 13 Ohio 120; Smith
v. Bridges, Breese 21 ; Wiseman v. MeNulty, 25 Cal. 230; or to one unborn:
Newson v. Thompson, 2 Ired. 277 ; Dupre. v. Dupree, Busb. Eq. 164; Hail
v. Thomas, 3 Strobh. 101; Hamilton v.
Pitchtr, 53 Mo. 334; although in Nelson -. Iverson, 24 Ala. 9, the property in
a share delivered by a father to his
daughter to belong to her child, with
which she was then pregnant, should it
be a boy, was held to vest in such boy at
his birth.
A grant to the heirs of a deceased
person is good: Shaw v. Loud, 12 Mass.
447 ; Boone v. Moore, 14 Mo. 420;
Gearheartv. Tharp, 9 B. Mon. 31 ; see
Sargent v. Simpson, 8 Me. 148; Duncan
v. Harper, 4 Rich. (N. S.) 84.
A deed to the heirs of a living person
is, ordinarily, void: Hall v. Leonard, 1
Pick. 27; Morris v. Stephens, 46 Penn.
St. 200; Inslow v. Winslow, 52 Ind.
8; Newsom v. Thompson, 2 Ired. 277.
Yet if apparent from the instrument,
who are the beneficiaries intended may
be shown: Hogg v. Odom, Dud. 185;
Martin v. Youngeblood, 8 Humph. 581;
Gearhartv. Tharp, 9 B. Mon. 34; Huss
v. Stephens, 51 Penn. St. 282; Huss v.
Morris, 63 Id. 367; .Flintv. Steadman,
36 Vt. 210; Hicman v. Quiun, 6 Yerg.
96 ; see, further, .Epperson v. Mills, 19
Tex. 65; Cole v. Lake Co., 54 N. H.
290 ; thus a deed to the joint-heirs of A.
and B., the grantor's daughter and sonin-law, was held good as to the two
-hildren of A. and B. then living, but
not as to any subsequently born.: Holman v. Fort, 3 Strobh. Eq. 66.
A note payable to the heirs of a living
person is valid: Bacon v. Fitch, 1 Root
181 ; Lockwood v. Jesup, 9 Conn. 272;

Cox v. Beltzhoover, 11 Mo. 142; but
see Bennington v. Dinsmore, 2 Gill 348.
A deed to S. or his heirs is good:
Ready v. Kearsley, 14 Mich. 215 ; Hogan
v. Page, 2 Wall. 605 ; see Carhartv.
Miller, 2 South. 573; or a bond payable to A. or B.: WTFte v. Hancock, 2
C. B. 830 ; but not a promissory note:
Musselman v. Oakes, 19 111. 81 ; Blunekenhagen v. Blundell, 2 B. & Ald. 417 ;
Osgood v. Pearsons,4 Gray 455 ; Aatlonal
Insurance Co. v. Allen, 116 Mass. 400;
Hayden v. Snell, 9 Gray 365; Willoughby v. )ldloughby, 5 N. H. 244.
In a conveyance to an unmarried
woman and her children, she takes a lifeestate with a remainder to her after-born.
children, if any: Fales v. Currien, 55
N. H. 392 ; Frazerv. Supervisors, 74 Ill
282; see Chessun v. Smith, 2 Law Repos.
(N. C.) 392.
If to a married woman and her children, those subsequently born do not
take: Ayton v. Ayton, 1 Cox Ch. 327;
Stroman v. Rottenbury, 4 Dessaus. 268 ;
Hogg v. Odom, Dud. 185; Grimes v. Orrand, 2 Heisk. 298: Holenman v. Fort, 3
Strobh. Eq. 66 ; Kitchiens v.Craig, 1 Bail.
119 ; unless a contrary intent appear:
Lillard v. Buckers, 9 Yerg. 64 ; Read v.
Tle, 8 Humph. 328; Shepherd v. Nabors, 6 Ala. 631 ; Watts v. Clardy, 2 Fla.
369; Conklin v. Conklin, 3 Sandf. Ch.
64; Woodruffv. Woodruff. 32 Ga. 358;
Houghton v. Kendall, 7 Allen 72; Forter
v. Shreve, 6 Bush 519 ; Simms v. Garrot, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 393 ; Bullock v.
Bullock, 2 Dev. Eq. 307 ; Noe v. Miller.
4 Stew. Eq. 324.
A life tenant's covenant indemnifying
one against damage and loss by reason
of suits by the covenantor's heirs, executors or administrators, was held not to
include such covenantor's children:
Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227,
275.
A mere contingent interest is subject
to legislation, affecting or destroying it,
before it becomes vested: Beallv. Bealls,
8 Ga. 210; Scott v. Key, 11 Ia. Ann.
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232; Slijht v. Read, 9 How. Pr. 278;
Aspden'o Estate, 2 Wall., Jr., 368;
Barnes v. Huson, 60 Barb. 598; Dixon
v. Dixon, 7 C.. E. Green 91 ; Marshall v.
King, 24 Miss. 85 ; Hill v. Uambers, 30
Mich. 432; Price v. Taylor, 28 Penn.
St. 95; 3cGunniglev. McKee, 77 Penn.
St. 81; see, however, Coleman v. Reed,
Carr. Walk. 258 ; Sindair v. Jackson, 8
Cow. 543; Gilpin v. IVilliams, 25 Ohic
St. 283; Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass.
336 ; .Shonk v. Brown, 61 Penn. St. 20 ;
Van Tilburgh v. Hollinshead, 1 MeCart.
32.
An heir cannot convey his interest or
expectancy in his ancestor's estate, before
such ancestor's decease, or the happening of the contingency ; Sullings v.
Richmond, 5 Allen 187: Jackson v. Bradtbrd, 4 Wend. 619; Tooley v. Dibble,
2 Hill (N. Y.) 641 ; Whitney v. Rust, I
Gratt. 483; Arrington v. Arrington, 2
Law Repos. (N. C.) 253; Dennett v.
Dennett, 40 N. H. 498 ; Vance v. Vance,
21 Me. 364; Grogan vy. Garrison, 27
Ohio St. 50; Striker v. Mott, 2 Paige
387; Ludewig's Case, 3 Rob. (La.) 99;
Beard v. Grgs, 1 A. K. Marsh. 26;
Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112; Hall
v. Chaffee, 14 N. H. 215 ; Blanchardv.
Brooks, 12 Pick. 47; Barksdalev. Gainage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271; Brewer v. Baxter,
41 Ga. 212; Hart v. Gregg, 32 Ohio
St.. 502; Pelletreau v. Jackson, 11 Wend.
110 ; Robertson v. tilson, 38 N. H. 48 ;
Hall v. Nute, Id. 422; Edwards v.
Vartkk, 5 Denio 664; or mortgage it:
Bayler v. Commonwealth, 40 Penn. St.
37 ; Carletonv. Leighton, 3 Meriv. 667 ;
Purcell v. Mather, 35 Ala. 570; Batty
v. Lloyd, 1 Vern. 141 ; Cook v. Feld, 15
Q. B. 475 ; John Street, 19 Wend. 659 ;
Hamilton v. Pitcher, 53 Mo. 334; Bacon
v. Bonham, 12 C. E. Green 209.
As to post obits, see 1 Story Eq. Jur.
N 342-348; Lushington v.
ailler, I H.
B1. 94; Spencer v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr.
125 ; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 234.
Equity will, however, enforce an executory contract to convey such contingent

101

interest to third persons, provided it bo
fair and bonafide: Hopson v. Treror, 1
Strange 533 ; PUpson v. Turner, 9 Sims.
245; linde v. Blake, 3 Beav. 234;
Westby v. Westby, 2 Dr. & War. 502 ;
Ridgway v. Underwood, 67 Ill. 419.
McLoughlin v. Maher, 17 Hfun 215;
Smallnman's Estate, Irish R. (8 Eq.)
249; Cook v. Feld, 15 Q. B. 463;
Nesmith v. Dinsmore, 17 N. H. 515;
Trull v. Eastman, 3 Mete. 121 ; Russ v.
Alpaugh, 118 Mass. 376; Curtis v. Curtis, 40 Me. 24 ; McDonald v. McDonald,
5 Jones Eq. 211 ; Stover v. Eycleshlmer,
46 Barb. 84 ; 3 Keyes 620 ; especially if
made to the ancestor: Cox v. 13elitha, 2
P. Wins. 272 ; Persse v. Persse, 7 CI. &
Fin. 279 ; Quarles v. Quarles, 4 Mass.
680; Jones v. Jones, 46 Iowa 466; Hirestone v. Firestone, 2 Ohio St. 415 ;
Needles v. Needles, 7 Id. 432; Eitzgerald v. Vestal, 4 Sneed 258 ; Parsons
v. Ely, 45 Ill. 232 ; IHaensv. Thompson,
11 C. E. Green 383 ; or to another heir :
ethered v. W1rethered, 2 Sim. 183;
Harwood v. Tooke, Id. 192; Hyde v.
White, 5 Id. 524 ; Jeffers v.'Lampson, 10
Ohio St. 101 ; Coates Street, 2 Ash. 12;
Walker v. talker, 67 Penn. St. 185 ;
D' Wolf Y. Gardiner, 9 R. I. 145 ; Miller v. Emans, 19 N. Y. 384; Lewis v.
Madisons, 1 Munf. 303; Jbhnson v. Hubbell, 2 Stock. 332 ; Smith v. Axtell, Saxt.
494 ; or with the ancestor's express consent: Fitch v. Fitch, 8 Pick. 480; Jenkiss v. Stetson, 9 Allen 128. But
equity does not always enforce such assignments : /eek v. Kettlewells, I Phila.
R. 342; Lowrry v. Spear, 7 Bush 451 ;
and may impose terms: Gwynne v. Ileaton, I Bro. C. C. 1 ; Green v. Broyles,
3 Humph. 167.
As to the mode of alienating such interest, see Dorsey Y. Smith, 7 Har. &
Johns. 345 ; Bennett v.Marris, 5 Rawle
9; Lintner v. Snyder, 15 Barb. 621 ;
Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Id. 328; Ackerman v. Vreeland, 1 McCart. 23; Faber
v. Police, 10 Rich. (N. S.) 376; icElwee v. Wlheder, Id. 392; Roof v. Foun-
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tain, 20 Barb. 527 ; McClure v. McClure, 1 Phila. R. 117; Hopper v.
Demarest, 1 Zab. 525.
A tenant by curtesy initiate may convey his interest in lands: Reaume v.
Chambers, 22 Mo. 36; Jackson T. Manems, 2 Wend. 357 ; McCorrg v. King,
3 Humph. 267 ; Evans v. .Kingsberry, 2
Rand. 120; McClain v. Gregg, 2 A. K.
Marsh. 457. See Oldham v. Henderson,
=
5 Dana 254. Or, one who has " enreceiving
tered" a tract of land, before
his patent therefor: Hayward v. Ormsbee, 11 Wis. 3; Harmer v. Morris, 1
McLean 44; Bledsoe v. Little, 4 How.
(M.iss.) 13; Lamb v. Kamm, 1 Sawy.
238 ; Carroll v. Norwood, 4 H. & McH.
287; Grahamv. Henry, 17 Tex. 164;
Cobb v. Stewart, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 255.
Or after an entry for condition broken:
Horner v. Chicago Railroad, 38 Wis.
165 ; 2 White & Tudor's Lead. Cas.
(4th ed.), 1609; Southard v. Central
Railroad Co., 2 Dutch. 13; Rice v.
Boston Railroad, 12 Allen 141; Boone
v. Tipton, 15 Ind. 270; Underhill v.
Saratoga Railroad Co., 20 Barb. 455.
An heir, whose title is abated by a
stranger, cannot devise it before entry :
Hall v. Hall, 3 Call. 488 ; I Jarm. on
Wills (5th Am. ed.), 153. See Watts
v. Cole, 2 Leigh 664 ; Varick v. Jackson, 2 Wend. 166; Herringtonv. Budd,
5 Den. 321 ; Leach v. Jay, Lav Rep.,
6 Ch. Div. 496; 9 Id. 42. Nor one
who has a mere possibility of reverter:
Deas v. Horry, 2 Hill Ch. 248; Miller
v. .1c6Aair, 11 Iowa 525. See Fowler
v. Griffin, 3 Sandf. 385.
A possibility, coupled with an interest,
is devisable or descendible: Manners
v. Manners, Spen. 142; Thornton v.
Roberts, 3 Stew. Eq. 476; Kean v.
Hof'ecker 2 Harring. 103; Thompson
v. Hoop, 6 Ohio St. 480; Lewis v.
Kemp, 3 Iredell Eq. 233; Ibndv. Bergh,
10 Paige 140, 153, and cases cited ; Davis
v. Bawcum, 10 Heisk. 406; Woodgate
v. Fleet, 44 N. Y. 1; Ingilby v. Amcotts, 21 Beav. 585; Moor v. Hawkins,

2 Eden 342; Austin v. Cambridgeport,
21 Pick. 215; 4 Kent 512; Wislow v.
Goodwin, 7 Mete. 363; Smith v. Sweringen, 26 Mo. 551 ; McDonald v. McMullen, 2 Mills 91 ; McMeeklin v. Bruwmet, 2 Hill Ch. 638. See Bigelow v.
Willson, I Pick. 493 ; Grayson v. Sandford, 12 La. Ann. 646. But not a bare
possibility, as, if a conveyance be to A.
and B., and the survivor A. has no
interest to assign during B.'s lifetime:
Doe v. Tomp-inson, 2 M. & Sel. 165:
Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wend. 178:
O'Bierne's Case, i Jon. & Lat. 352:
Decker v. Saltsman, I Hun 421 ; 59
N. Y. 275. See facAdam v. Logan,
3 Bro. C. C. 310; Thomas v. Jones, !
DeG., J. & S. 63; Miller v. Emans, 19
N. Y. 384 ; Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Barb.
328.
No act of the life-tenant, or trustee of
such life-tenant, can affect the rights
of the remaindermen: Putnam v. Gleason, 99 Mass. 454; Noble v. Andruas,
37 Conn. 346 ; Jackson v. Edwards, 22
Wend. 498 ; Hall v. Want, Phil. (N.C.)
502 ; Frazer v. Supervisors, 74 I11. 282 ;
Emison v. Whittlesey, 55 Mo. 254:
Austin v. Rutland Railroad, 45 Vt. 215 Fdtman v. Butts, 8 Bush 115 ; List v.
Rodney, 83 Penn. St. 483; Hosmer v.
Carter, 68 Ill. 98; Wilkins v. Kirk.
bride, 12 C. E. Green 93; Booraem v
Wells, 4 Id. 87. See Knight v. Weatherwax, 7 Paige 182; .Baylor v. D#
.Tarnette, 13 Gratt. 152; Stephens v.
Evans, 30 Ind. 39; Hamilton v. Pitcher,
53 Mo. 334; Lewis v. Arelson, 4 Mich.
630; Garner v. Dowling, 11 Heisk. 48;
Allen v. Allen, 2 Tenn. Ch. 28; Murrell
v. Mathews, 2 Bay 397.
But statutory proceedings authorizing
courts to convey or release estates in
expectancy, &c., are valid: Beioley v.
Carter,Law Rep., 4 Ch. App. 230; Basnett v. Moxon, Law Rep., 20 Eq. 182;
Wills v. Slade, 6 Ves. 498 ; Gaskell v.
Gaske, 6 Sim. 643; Mead v. Mitchell,
17 N. Y. 210 ; Williman T. Holmes, 4
Rich. Eq. 475; Faulkner v. Davis, 18
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Gratt 651; L)yless v, Bla. 'star, 43
,vindrsv. K,,ppt an, 68
Ga. 327;
'Mo. 482 : NVatter v. luassdl, 3 )vete.
(Ky.) 163; Taylor v. Blake, 109 Mass.
51: ; Dodd's Case, Phil. (N. C.) Eq.
97; tick'le's Case, 10 C. E. Green 53;
(L,m v. Keith, 1 Hun 589.
A contingent remainder cannot be
scized on execution: Allen v. Scury, 1
Yerg. 36 ; Dargan v. Richardson, Dud.
62; Penn v. Spencer, 17 Gratt. 85 ;
Il'atson v. Dodd, 68 N. C.. 528 ; Jackson
v. Middlhton, 52 Barb. 9 ; Perkins V.
Clark, 3 Head 734 ; .lllstons v. Bank, 2
Ilill Ch. 242; Baker v. Copenbarger, 15
Ill. 103; ]idIeway v. Underwood, 67
Id. 430; ,striker v. M1ott, 28 N. Y. 82.
See Lodcwood v. Yye, 2 Swan 515;
Payn v. Beal, 4 Denio 405 ; lloodgate
v. Fleet, 44 N. Y. 1; Sheridan V.
hluse, 4 Ahb. Ap. 218; Bolton V.
Stretch, 3 Stew. Eq. 536.
What contingent interests pass under
an insolvent, or bankrupt assignment.
See Inkson's Trusts, 21 Beav. 310;
Ivson v. Gassiot, 27 Eng. Law & Eq.
483; Duggan's Trusts, Law Rep., 8
Eq1. 697 ; Mitchell v. Hughes, 6 Bing.
689; Burn v. Carvalho, 1 Ad. & El.
883; Gibbins v. Egden, Law Rep., 7
Eq. 371; Higden v. Williamson, 3 P.
Wins. 131; Mfudge v. l'owan, Law
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Rep., 3 Exch. 185 ; Blakemore's Case,
Law Rep., 5 Ch. Div. 372 -Davis's
Case, Mont. 297 ; Naden's Case, Law
Rep., 9 Ch. 670 ; imms v. Davis, 7
Tex. 26 ; Oucalt v. Van Winkle, I Gr.
Ch. 513; Sandjbrd v. Lackland, 2 Dill.
6 ; Krumbaar v. Burt, 2 Wash. C. C.
406; Kinzie v. Winston, 56 Ill. 56;
Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57 ; Butler v.
Merchants' Insurance Co., 8 Ala. 146;
Shay v. Sessaman, 10 Penn. St. 432;
Aloth v. Fromne, Amb. 394; Vizard's
Trusts, Law Rep., 1 Eq. 667 ; I Ch.
588 ; Lee v. Olding, 2 Jur. (N. S.)
850; lash's Estate, 2 Pars. 160; Stuckert v. Harvey, 1 Miles 247 ; Shaw v.
Steward, I Ad. & E. 300.
Qu(ere, as to a mere right to take
advantage of a breach of the condition
subsequent by entry, being leviable:
Leach v. Leach, 10 Ind. 271; Thomas
v. Record, 47 Me. 500.
For instances of assignments of expectancies, &c., under statutory provisions, see .3Moore v. Little, 40 Barb.
488; 41 N. Y. 66; Sheridan v. House,
4 Abb. Ct. of App., Dec. 218; Stover
v. Eycleshimer, 3 Keyes 620; Goodel v.
Hibbard, 32 Mich. 47 ; 4 Kent *512 ;
Turpin v. Turpin, Wythe 22 (137);
Lawrence v. Bayard, 7 Paige 70.
JoHn H. STEWA RT.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
WILLIAM A. CASPER, EX'R., v. FRANK P. WALKER.
A testator gave to his daughter Amy his homestead farm, subject to an annuity to
his widow, and then provided: "It is further my will that the said Amy R. Turner
resia on the aforesaid farm after my decease, and take proper care of the same.
In case they (I mean Amy R. Turner and her husband) should not see proper to
move on the same, then I order my executor hereinafter named to sell the same
farm at public vendue to the highest bidder." The testator died in 1869, and soon
afterwards Amy and her husband moved on the farm and resided there for two
years, and then leased it and moved elsewhere. They returned to the farm in the
spring of 1810 and have resided there since. Held, that the estate of Amy in the
farm was a fee-simple, and not defeaible by her non-residence thereon, and that the
executor's power of sale of the farm was limited to Amy's not having mcved there
at all.
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RuNYoN, Chancellor.-Ebenezer Peterson died in 1869, leaving
his widow Clarissa C., and his daughter Amy his only heir-atlaw, surviving. By his will he provided as follows: "I give and
bequeath unto my beloved wife, Clarissa C. Peterson, the sum of
four thousand dollars, the same to be put at interest in some safe
investment, and secured to her during her natural life." "Also,
I give and bequeath unto my said wife the annual income of four
hundred dollars, to be paid half-yearly, from the farm where I now
reside, in the township of Lower Penn's Neck, purchased of
Thomas D. Bradway; the said income to be paid in full, without
any deductions for taxes or other expenses; this being my expressed wish and will." "Also, I give and bequeath unto my
beloved wife, Clarissa C., the choice of all my household goods
and furniture, or the whole of them, if she chooses, without any
reservation." "I give and bequeath unto my daughter, Amy R.
Turner, wife of Jonathan I. Turner, the homestead farm where I
now reside, in the township of Lower Penn's Neck, adjoining lands
of John Dunn and Elijah W. Dunn, containing aboutwone hundred
and five acres, more or less, save the legacy of four hundred dollars
Per year, payable to my wife, Clarissa as above specified."
"It is further my will, that the said Amy R. Turner reside on
the aforesaid farm, after my decease, and take proper care of the
same. In case they (I mean Amy R. Turner and her husband),
should not see proper to move on the same, then I order my
executor, hereinafter named, to sell the same farm at public vendue
to the fighest bidder; but there is nothing herein contained that
affects the dower -of four hundred dollars devised to my wife aforesaid."

"Further, I order and direct the balance of my personal property, after securing the four thousand dollars, to be equally
divided between my wife, Clarissa C., and my daughter, Amy R.
Turner."
The $4000 have been duly invested, and the interest paid to the
widow. The questions submitted are: What interest does the
widow take in the $4000 ? What estate does the daughter take
in the farm, under the devise thereof to her, and is that estate
defeasible on her ceasing to reside on the property?
The gift of $4000 to the testator's wife is absolute in its terms.
It is not given over in any event, either expressly or by implication. The will. indeed, provides that it shall be invested for and
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secured to her during her life, but that is merely a provision as to
the manner of its enjoyment by her during her life; the gift of the
fund is, nevertheless, absolute, subject to the qualifying trust:
Woodward v. Woodward, 1 0. E. Green 83; Kay v. Kay, 3 Gr.
Oh. 495; Hawkins on Wills 268; Gulick v. Gulick, 10 C. E.
Green 324; s. c. on appeal, 12 Id. 498.
The devise of the homestead farm to Amy is in fee, subject to
the charge of the annuity to the widow. It is not defeasible by
her non-residence on the property. The testator declares that
it is his will that Amy reside on the farm after his death, and take
proper care of it, and provides, that in case she and her husband
should not "see proper to move on the same," his executor sell it.
He adds a further provision, that such conversion of the farm into
money shall not affect the gift of the annuity charged thereon in
the devise.
Amy is the testator's only heir-at-law. He died, as before
stated, in 1869. Soon after his death, Amy and her husband
removed to the farm, and resided there for about two years. They
then leased it, and it was occupied by their tenant. In the spring
of 1880, they returned to it, and ever since then have resided
thereon.
The intention of the testator, in the provision under consideration, was, not to defeat the devise to his daughter, but to secure
the property against want of care. He not only does not provide
that. in case of non-compliance with his direction, the farm shall go
over to some one else, but he makes no provision whatever in that
connection, except that the farm be converted by his executor into
money by sale. He makes no disposition of the proceeds of the
property after conversion. The residuary clause is confined, by
its terms, to his personal estate. If the farm were converted,
under this provision, the proceeds, subject to the annuity, would
go to Amy under the devise; and, apart from that, it would go to
her as heir. The annuity is given expressly in lieu of dower.
That the testator did not mean to provide that his daughter should
reside on the property for life, is evidenced by the use of the word
" move," in the second clause. In the first, he expresses his desire
that she and her husband should reside on the farm, and take
proper care of it. In the second, he orders that if they do not
" see proper to move on" the property, the executor is to sell it.
There is no evidence of any intention on his part to compel his
VOL. XXIX.-14
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daughter to reside on -the farm as a cogdition of her title to it
under the devise. The language of the first clause is merely
expressive of his desire. It has no mandatory character, but is
merely precatory. The provision, taken altogether, is, as if he had
said that he desired that his daughter and her husband occupy his
homestead farm as their home immediately after his death, and
enter on such occupation and care for it accordingly; but if such
should not be their wish, then, in order to secure it against depreciation from want of care, he directed that it be converted into
cash, the sale to be subject to the annuity-charge, but the proceeds
to go to his daughter. The daughter moved to and resided on the
farm for about two years, and then leased it and again removed to
it, and now resides thereon. There is no provision that in case
she, having removed to it, leaves it and ceases to reside there, the
property shall be sold, but merely that it shall be sold if she does
not see proper to move there at all. The provision for sale is
limited in its operation by its terms, and there is no reason for
going beyond the literal import of them; to do so, would be to
extend it indefinitely, for it would not even be limited by and cease
with the annuity. Such construction would give the executor
power to sell whenever the daughter should cease to reside on the
farm. The testator, undoubtedly, contemplated no such construction. What he meant was, that in case his daughter should not be
willing at his decease to enter on the occupancy of the farm as her
residence, it should then be sold, and if sold it should be sold subject to the annuity, and the proceeds of the sale should go to her.
He did not intend to cloud her title with an ever impending power
of sale. The executor has not now, and will not have, any duty
in respect to the sale of the farm.
The following cases show what words
confer on a devisee the right to reside on
the lands devised:
"That testator's daughters should
not be deprived of a home, while they
remained single :" Ndson v. Ndson, 19
Ohio 282 ; that a mother "may be permitted to occupy" lands devised to
,estator's children: Snowill v. Snowiil,
3 Zab. 447 ; that "C. shall have a house,
during her natural life, on the farm
hereinbefore bequeathed to W. :" Wil,ett v. Carroll, 13 Md. 459. * * * That

"I also allow my son to give her [testator's widow] a support off my plantation, during her life :" Hunter v. StenSee Cabeen v.
iidge, 12 Ga. 192.
Gordon, 1 Hill Ch. 51. "That T. take
care of his grandmother as long as she
lives, and she is to live on the land I
now live on, and to have the benefit of
living on it as long as she may live :"
Gentry v. Jones, 6 J. J. Marsh. 148 ;
that testator's daughter should have
"the use and improvement of so much
of my house as she may need during bet
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life, and also a privilege at the fire,
which I have made for my wife, while
they live together:" hKinynan v. Kingman, 121 Mass. 249; that testator's
widow, to whom a house had been
given, for life, should "keep his house
open to any of his children that may be,
or have been, indigent or unfortunate :"
Lewis v. Reed, 10 Ga. 293; that testator's wilow have "the reasonable use
of two suitable rooms in the house that
we may happen to dwell in at the time
of mv decease:" Beeson v. Elliott, 1
Del. Ch. 368 ; "the full privilege of
the house, and water, and firewood :"
Crai v. (raiq, Bail. Eq. 102; "as a
residence for her [testator's widow] and
any of my daughters who may remain
single :" Rivers v. Rivers, 9 Rich. Eq.
203 ; "the use of the mansion house
ani furniture, and usual family accommodations:" Pinckney v. Piackney, 2
Rich. Eq. 218 ; " and to live and remain, as long as she is unmarried, in
my house, and enjoying the same privileges as she now does:" 31aeck v.
Nason, 21 Vt. 115; "my wife is to
have a house, and good support as long
us she lives on the home premises, board
and clothing," &c. : Goodrich's Case,
38 Wis. 492.
A devise to testator's wife for life,
and then : "It is my wish, my son W.
should live with his mother, * * * and
after her death, the fee to be his own,"
gives no present estate in the land to
W.: Head v. Head, 7 Jones 620. A
devise of a lot for life, and of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), to enable
the devisee to build a house thereon,
does not compel him to build the house:
Ashe v. Ashe, Rich. Eq. Cas. 380. See
Five Points House v.. Amerman, 11 Hun
161 ; Beck's Appeal, 46 Penn. St. 527.
The following words were held to
render the devise conditional, upon the
devisee's residence on the premises:
that "if A. refuses to dwell there himself, or keep in his own possession:"
Doe v. fawke, 2 East 481 ; that "every

such person should live and reside on the
said estate called Juts :" Fdllinghamv.
Bromley, Turn. & Russ. 530; "that
* ** the use and enjoyment should be
offered, rent free, to his oldest child, for
the time being, as long as he or she
should please, and in case of refusal, or
of his or her ceasing to occupy the same,
then to his other children in succession :"
M1acklaren v. ,Stainton, 4 Jur. (N. S.)
199 ; that the devisee should "reside"
in the mansion house for six months in
every year: Milcot v. Botfield, Kay
534 ; "that the devisee's estate should
be forfeited in case he did not make the
mansion house his usual and common
place of abode and residence :" ynne
v. Fietcher, 24 Bear. 430 ; "that the
person entitled should with his family
reside at the mansion house, and make
it his principal place of abode :" Dunne
v. Dunne, 3 Sm. & Giff. 22 ; 7 De G.,
M. & G. 207; "on the express condition only, that she remove into and live
in said house, herself and family:"
Hart v. Chesley, 18 N. H. 373: "that
my wife is to keep my children, and
raise them and give them a sufficient
schooling :" Cranjbrd v. Platterson, 11
Gratt. 364 ; " that a plantation he given
to E. & M., provided they come and
live on it :" Lowe Y. Cloud, 45 Ga. 481
that "B. should remain on the farm,"
and pay certain charges: Lindsey v.
Lindsey, 45 Ind. 552; that lands should
go to 0., "providing he shall live on
the place, and carry it on ina workmanlike manner:" Marston v. Marston, 47
Me. 495. See, further, Moore Y. Gamble, I Stock. 246.
But a condition that if any of the devisee's "shall not settle on my land, or
those now settled will not remain on
said land, but will remove off and leave
the same," was deemed void: Parduev.
Givens, 1 Jones Eq. 306; so, a devise
to testator's children "in case they continue to inhabit the town of H. :" Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Caines 345. See
Reeves v. Craig, I Winst. 209 ; heeler v.
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Keeler, 39 Vt. 550; Wren v. Bradley,
2 De G. & Sm. 49 ; Rose v. Iles, 20
W. R. 858 ; so, if a dev -. c should not
cease to reside in S., within a limited
time: Wilkinson i. Wilkinson, Law
Rep., 12 Eq. 604; Forward v. Taner,
9 Gratt. 537.
The following words were held not to
be conditional; but that the devisee
might reside elsewhere without forfeiting
the devise ; that testator's wife "shall
have her maintenance off of the farm
devised to J., while she lives * * *
that J. is to let her have the house while
she lives, and to furnish her with everything necessary to her comfort :" Tope
v. Tope, 18 Ohio 520; that she should
have "a comfortable room," and "sufficient maintenance during her natural
life:" Steele's Appeal, 47 Penn. St.
437 ; that "my five daughters shall have
a home in the house, and a reasonable
support, during their single lives from
the said farm,"--not lost by one becommg a Sister of Charity: Donnelly v.
Edelen, 40 Md. 117 ; that "I give unto
my wife E. the use of that part of my
house which I now occupy, during her
widowhood, and her full and comfortable support, &c. :" Van Duyne v. Van
Duyne, 1 McCart. 49; that A. should
have "the right to occupy and possess
my estate called Bellegrove, and the furniture, &c., there or elsewhere, during her
natural life and widowhood :" Kearney
v. Kearney, 2 C. E. Green 59, 504; see
Murphy v. Murphy, 20 Ga. 549: that a
son, to whom a farm had been given
"afford a lawful maintenance to my
daughter A., and her two daughters,
from nid farm, as long as they live and
shall want the same,' and that "A. shall
abide and have a lawful maintenance and
her two daughters with her, on said
farm, as long as the said A. lives, and
her two daughters shall want their maintenance," as to the daughters, after A.'s
death: Stillwell v. Pease, 3 Gr. Ch. 74 ;
that "my mother is to have her support
on my estate, to the amount of forty dol-

lars a year, if she chooses to remain or
my estate, and if she chooses to go away,
she is to be paid the sum. of forty dollars
a year during her natural life :" Henru
v. Barrett, 6 Allen 500 ; "that it is my
desire that my son Aaron remove back
to this country, and to have them
(slaves), but not to take them to any
other part of the country :" Barris v.
Hearne, Winst. Eq. 91.
Cases where the devisee might let the
premises to another ; that testator's two
sons might have the "use and occupation" of certain lands, by paying a
stated rent: Rabbeth v. Squire, 19 Beav.
70 ; that W. may have the choice of
those two rooms which shall the best suit
her, because I desire that the said W.
should be sure of a shelter during the
time she may live :" Wusthoff v. Dracourt, 3 Watts 240; that a widow might
have "the free use and enjoyment of the
portions of the house," which she and
testator then occupied: Tobias v. Cohn,
36 N. Y. 363 ; "the free occupancy of
any house in my possession, for her life,
free of any payments or charge whatever:" .fannox v. Greener, L. R., 14
Eq. 456; see further: Tramell v.
Johnston, 54 Ga. 341 ; IVhittone v. Lamb,
12 M. & W. 813; Thomas v. Boyd, 13
Ind. 333; Davis v. Vincent, 1 Houst.
416 ; Smith v. Jewett, 40 N. 11. 530.
The devise is not forfeited if the condition be broken by the act of God, as
v. Richardson, L. R.,
by death: Sutcliffe
13 Eq. 607 ; McLacilan v. McLachlan,
9 Paige 534; Sampson v. Down, 2 Chit.
529 ; see Hayard v. Angell, 1 Vern.
222; or by insanity: Burns v. Cl-rk,
37 Barb. 496 ; or by the destruction of
the house devised, by fire: Schanch v.
Arrowsmith, 1 Stock. 314, 330 ; Tilden v.
Tilden, 13 Gray l*3; or by leaving the
premises through constraint: Jordan v.
Clark, 1 C. E. Gr. 243; Roe v. Roe, 6
Id. 253; Craven v. Bleakney, 8 Watts
19; Hogeboom v. Hall- 24 Wend.
146 ; Huckabee v. Swoope, 20 Ala. 491 ;
see Philipsv. Walter, 2 Bro. P. C. 198 ;
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rr by taking possession of the premises
with a bonaJide intention of permanentLy residing there, and subsequently removing: Brundagev. Domestic Society, 60
Barb. 204; Hunt v. Beeson, 18 Indiana
380; or by going to sea: Shaw v. Steward, 1 A. & E. 300; or by tempo.ary
absence: Hart v. Chesley, 18 N. H.
383; see .McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Penn.
St. 140; alter, as to an absence of
several years: Crawford v. Patterson, 11
Gratt. 364 ; or by the bankruptcy of the
devisee: Goldney's Case, 3 Deac. 570;
or by impossibility of performance
through testator's act: Bunbury v. Doran,
Irish R. (8 C. L.) 516, (9 C. L.)
284 ; Hlearn v. Cannon, 4 Honst. 20;
Afartin v. Ballou, 13 Barb. 119; Lamb
v. M3iller, 18 Penn. St. 448; Walker v.
Walker, 2 DeG., F. & J. 255; or by

operation of law: Adams v. Bass, 18
Ga. 130; Curry v. Curry, 30 Id. 253;
31iller v. Lewis, 33 Id. 61 ; Tennille v.
Phelps, 49 Id. 532; 3Maddox v. Maddox,
11 Gratt. 804 ; or by the voluntary release or waiver of the person entitled to
a performance: Jones v. Bramblet, I
Scam. 276; Petro v. Cassiday, 13 Ind.
289 ; Boone v. Tipton, 15 Id. 270 ;
Rush v. Rush, 40 Id. 183 ; Craw/brd v.
Woods, 6 Bush 200 ; BVilson v. Wilson,
38 Me. 18 ; Siuonds v. Sitnonds., 3
lete. 558; Spaulding v. Hlallenbeck, 39
Barb. 79 ; Brewster v. Brewster, 4
Sandf. Ch. 22 ; Buckmaster v. Xeedham,
22 Vt. 617 ; WVells v. Wells, 37 Id. 483,
see Frost v. Butler, 7 Me. 225 ; M3anwell v. Briggs, 17 Vt. 176 ; .Hubbardv.
Hubbard, 12 Allen 586.
Jom H. STwWRT.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
THE STATE v. FRED. M. SPAULDING.
Certain parties called as jurors testified on their voir dire that they bad heard, or
read of the matters charged in the information, and had formed opinions thereon ;
but it appearing from the whole of their examinations that such opinions were not
settled, or fixed, and that they could give full and fair consideration to all the
testimony and be guided solely by it in their conclusions, it is held that the challenges were properly overruled.
Defendant was city clerk. By ordinance, it was his duty to prepare and seal
city licenses upon production to him of the receipt of the city treasurer showing that
the license-money had been paid. In fact, for years the custom had been for the
ricensee to pay the money directly to the clerk and receive from him the license, and
the clerk thereafter handed the money to the treasurer. The entire business was
transacted by the clerk. This was done to the knowledge of the mayor, council
And other officers of the city. Defendant embezzled certain of the moneys thus
ieceived by him. It did not appear that the city ever disavowed this authority, or
ever made any effort to re-collect from the licensees these moneys. Held, That a
conviction under an information charging the embezzlement of these as the moneys
of the city must be sustained, and that though neither the city nor the licensees
might have been concluded by his acts, yet, that he, by the issue of the license, was
estopped from denying that the moneys which he had received in payment thereof
were the moneys of the city.

INFORMATION for embezzlement. Trial at the December Term
1879, of the District Court, and verdict and judgment for The
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State. The defendant appealed.
opinion.

The facts are stated in thu

Thomas P. Fenlon and Lucien Baker, for appellant.
Joseph W. Taylor, N. .H. Wood and -E. L. Camey (City
Attorney), for The State.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.---[After discussing a matter of local practice and
interest.] * * *

A second matter is the alleged error in overruling the challenges
of certain jurors. One juror testified that he had an opinion,
founded upon rumor, that public money was missing; that he had
no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of defendant; and that he
believed defendant was city clerk, Another, that he had an
opinion that public money was lost or stolen; that he had, on
reading of the matter, made no inquiry whether it was true or
false; and that his opinion would not influence him in any way
in the trial of the case; and that he could give due consideration
to the testimony. A third gave substantially the same answers to
the questions put to him. Within the rule laid down in the Medlicott 048e, 9 Kas. 257, we think the challenges were properly
overruled. It does not appear that either of these parties had
such settled opinions or convictions as would prevent them from
being impartial jurors. A matter of this kind always gets into
the papers, and is the subject of talk in the community, and it
would be almost impossible to find an intelligent man in the county
who had not read or heard of it. The use of the word "opinion"
is not always conclusive. If unexplained, and upon an essential
and disputed fact, it may be: The State v. Brown, 15 Kas. 400.
But the real condition of the juror's mind is to be determined from
the whole of his testimony. He may have heard or read, but if
he appears free to give full consideration to all the testimony, and
to be influenced by it alone, he is competent. So far as the fact
that defendant was city clerk is concerned, we do not think that
actual knowledge thereof would disqualify. There are facts in
many cases which must be proved, and yet facts which all men
know. The fact that a certain party is an 'incumbent of a prominent public office, is one which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a citizen ignorant of. In a prosecution for malfeasance
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in that office, must the knowledge of such incumbency disqualify
a juror? If a public building is destroyed by fire, every one knows
of it. Could no man sit as a juror upon the trial of one charged
with setting it on fire who knew that the building had been burned?
We think the jurors were competent, and the rulings of the District Court correct.
We pass now to the vital question in the case, one very.forcibly
presented and fully discussed by counsel on both sides, and one of
great difficulty. The facts upon which this question arises are
these: Defendant was the city clerk; the money which he is
charged with embezzling came from two sources-licenses, and
from what is known as the "1dog tax." Under the city ordinances,
applicants for licenses were required to pay the license fee to the
city treasurer, who issued duplicate receipts therefor, upon the production of which the license was to issue. The city clerk prepared
and attested the license, which was signed by the mayor, but he
had nothing to do with the receipt of the money. The provisions
concerning the dog tax were different, for as to that the ordinance
in terms authorized the clerk to receive the tax, and thereafter pay
it over to the city treasurer. Unquestionably this money, while
in his hands, was city money, and an embezzlement of it was an
embezzlement of city funds. But this was only a small portion
of the moneys charged to have been embezzled. By far the larger
portion was received from licenses, and this license-money was
received by him under a custom which had existed for years, and
to the knowledge of the mayor, council and other officers of the
city. The applicant for a license would go to the city clerk, pay
him the money, and receive the license, which he would take to
the mayor for hris signature. This money, thus received, was
thereafter paid over by the clerk to the treasurer. In other words,
to avoid the circuity of going to the treasurer, obtaining his receipt,
and with that obtaining from the clerk the license, the business
was transacted directly with the clerk. This, starting as a matter
of convenience, had been for years an established custom. The
license-money all passed through this channel into the hands of
the treasurer. It did not appear that the city had ever disavowed
defendant's authority to receive these moneys, or had ever made
any effort to re-collect them from the licensees.
Upon these facts, defendant asked the court to instruct the jury
that no conviction could be had for embezzling this license-money,
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inasmuch as the charge was of embezzling money of the city,
and this money never having passed into the hands of the treasurer, was still the money of the various licensees, or at any rate
was not the money of the city. This the court refused to give,
and on the other hand, charged in substance, that the city was an
incorporation, and might employ agents without providing therefor
by ordinance, and that if one, with the assent of the mayor and
council, acting in the capacity of agent, clerk, servant or bailee
to the city should receive moneys belonging to the city and embezzle them, he might be convicted, although the ordinances
provided that all dues of the city should be payable to the city
treasurer. Upon these facts it is strenuously insisted by defendant
that, within the ruling in the case of Te Hartford Insurance
Co. v. The State, 9 Kas. 210, this money was still the money of
the licensees. In that case the law required that the license-fee
should be paid into the state treasury before any license should be
issued by the auditor. There, as here, the insurance companies
had been in the habit of transacting their business entirely with
the auditor, paying him the money and receiving from him the
license, and leaving the auditor to settle with the treasurer. After
the receipt by the auditor of the money, and the issue by him
of the license, but before any money had been paid to the treasurer, the old law was repealed and . new law enacted. It was
held by this court that the new law controlled, that the license
was improperly issued, and that the auditor in receiving the money
was the agent of t&ie insurance company, and not of the state. In
the opinion, KiNamAN, C. J., says: "The limits of an officer's
authority are found in the law." And again: "If the corporation
chose to pay this (the license-money) through the auditor, then for
that purpose the auditor was the agent of the corporation, and not
of the state; and until the money reached the state treasury, it
was under the control of the corporation, and not of the state."
The same doctrine was re-affirmed in the case of The City of
Eureka v. Davis, 21 Kas. 578. The ordinances give to a city
officer the limits of his authority precisely as the statutes give to
the state officer his limits. The city is not bound by the acts of the
one outside of those limits, any more than the state by the like acts
of the other. The money paid by the licensees to the clerk was
within their control until paid to the treasurer. They could recall
and recover it. The city could ignore the payment, and collect it
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again. That the licensees have not asserted their right, does not
disprove its existence. They may yet assert it and recover their
money, and the city may yet call upon them for the license fees.
As their money, they may prosecute for its embezzlement, and this
prosecution would be no bar. He may yet, and rightly, pay it
back to them, or they may recover it by suit; and then upon what
will this prosecution rest? The anomaly would be presented of a
conviction for embezzling certain moneys as the property of one
party, and a judgment asserting that it belongs to another. The
question is not one simply of moral turpitude, but of legal right.
The defendant is entitled to protection against several prosecutions
for the one wrong.
On the other hand, the state rests upon the broad proposition,
that when a party assumes to act for another, he is concluded by
that assumption, no matter who else is bound; that if A. assumes
to act as the agent of B., and receives money belonging to B., he
cannot thereafter deny that it is B.'s money, and that, notwithstanding B. is not concluded by his acts, and though in fact he
was not the agent of B.; that this doctrine, universally recognised
in civil, is equally true in criminal law. A man may not say, "I
have the right to receive money," and receive it, and then, when
challenged for its receipt or embezzlement, avoid liability by saying, "I had no right to receive it." He has voluntarily assumed
a position, the responsibilities of which he may not avoid. The
defendant may not say that he holds this money simply for the
licensees, because he himself has issued the licenses,, which he
might rightfully issue only when the city had received the money;
that by issuing, he conclusively, so far as he was concerned,
affirmed that the money he had received and was holding, was city
money. The law of estoppel binds him, whether it binds any one
else or not, and is equally potent in a criminal as well as a civil
action. Concede that there may be a difference between a private
and a municipal corporation, as to whether the corporation is
bound by the knowledge of its officers of the acts of the assumed
agent, for the by-laws of the former are known only to its officers,
and if they permit one to continue acting as agent, outside the
scope of his actual powers, parties dealing with him may be justified in presuming that his apparent are his real powers, and so
hold the corporation to his acts. While the ordinances of the
latter are of public knowledge, and every one is chargeable with
VoL. XX
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notice of the limit of his powers as defined by the ordinances, yet,
so far as the agent is concerned, the rule is the same, and whether
he be acting for an individual, a private or a municipal corporation, he binds himself at least and equally in all three cases. It is
indeed further said that this was, in law and in fact, the city's
money; that the doctrine of ratification applies; that any principal may ratify the acts of an assumed agent, and that such ratification is equivalent to prior authority; that here the city council,
the mayor and other officers had full knowledge of the manner of
conducting the license collections; that for years they permitted it
to continue in this way, and that permitting it to be so done was
equivalent to granting authority to so do it; that the city has
never attempted to re-collect this license-money, nor the licensees
to recover it from the clerk, and that therefore all parties in interest have assented to this manner of doing business, and that it
would be the height of'legal absurdity to permit the chief actor,
the real wrongdoer, to dispute the authority he has assumed and
avoid liability for a crime which his own assumption of authority
has alone given him power to commit. Reference is made to 2
Whart. on Orim. Law, 7th ed., sect. 1920, in whi ch the author
says that "while the reason of the thing requires that the money
embezzled should have been received by the defendant within the
orbit of his employment, yet where he succeeds in getting money
on the basis of such employment from third parties, and when
there is a legal duty resting on him to pay over such money to his
employers, then the embezzlement of such money is within the
statute."
In -Exparte ffedle], 31 Cal. 108, the court ruled that "if an
of an
agent obtains the money of his principal in the -capacity
his
by
authorized
not
agent, but still in a manner in which he was
with
use
own
agency to receive it, and converts the same to his
intent to steal or embezzle it, it is money received ' in the course
of his employment as agent.' " It is true that case is'not parallel
with this, for in that it appeared that the master paid the checks
of the agent, supposing them to have been drawn in the prosecution of the agency; he actually obtained the principal's money.
In Rex v. Beechey, 1 'R. & R. 318, a clerk' authorized to
abroad
receive money at home from put-door collectors, received it
the
within
be
to
held
was
case
the
yet
from out-door customers;
626.
P.
&
C.
6
statute. See also Rex v. Williams,
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Bishop, in his work on Criminal Law, 3d ed., sect. 367, says that
"in reason, whenever a man claims to be a servant while getting
into his possession, by force of his claim, the property to be embezzled, he should be held to be such on his trial for the embezzlement. Why should not the rule of estoppel, known throughout
the entire civil department of our jurisprudence, apply in the
criminal ?" See also the case of The State v. William H. Heath,
recently decided in the Court of Appeals of St. Louis county, Mo.
In that case the defendant was auditor, and as such had charge of
the bonds and mortgages given to secure the money loans of the
schools, but the money was payable to and receivable by the treasurer. Still for several years the money was actually received by
him, and the county court allowed him compensation for his services in the matter. He embezzled these funds, and it was held
that he might be convicted of embezzling public funds received by
him as agent of the county. The actual relation of principal and
agent was held sufficient; the existence of a legal relation was
unnecessary.
We are of opinion that the argument of the state is the better,
and that the ruling of the District Court must be sustained. We
intend no departure from the views expressed in the case of the
Hartford ns. Co. v. The State, aupra. We do not affirm that
the city was concluded by the defendant's acts, nor indeed that
any one is estopped but himself. But we hold that when one
assumes to act as agent for another, he may not, when challenged
for those acts, deny his agency; that he is estopped not merely as
against his assumed principal, but also as against the state; that
one who is agent enough to receive money, is agent enough to be
punished for embezzling it. An agency de facto, an actual, even
though not legal, employment is sufficient. The language of the
statute is: "If any officer, agent, clerk or servant of any incorporation, or any person employed in 8uch capacity:" Crimes Act,
sect. 88.
Further, that the defendant received this money as the money
of the city, is conclusively as against him, shown by his issue of the
license, for he was authorized to issue that only after the city-had
obtained possession of the money. The issue was an affirmance by
him that all things preliminary thereto had been performed, among
which was, that the title to the money had passed from the licensee
to the city-an affirmance which he might not thereafter deny.
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This is not the case of a single or an Qccasional payment by a
debtor of the city to an officer thereof of his debt, where such
officer is charged with no duty springing out of the receipt by the
city of its debt, and is not the legal custodian of the city's moneys.
Thus the officer might be, to the common understanding of all
parties, simply the agent of the debtor, acting merely to accommodate him. Here, by settled course of business, payment of the
city's dues was made to and received by the defendant. While
such payment might not legally conclude the city, yet the evident
understanding of all, the defendant included, was, that payment
had actually been made; that the money was now the property
of the city, and that the license for which the money was due,
might properly issue, and it was issued, and by defendant. He
voluntarily assumed full charge of this entire matter, including the
receipt of the money and the issue of the license. The money was
paid to him because of his office and to induce his official action;
and he may not now say that it was not received "by virtue of his
employment or office," or that its receipt was not one of the prescribed legal duties of such office. In the case of Regina v. Orman, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 611, it appeared that defendant was
employed in the service of the justices of Bedfordshire, as storekeeper and clerk of the prison, under the governor of the county
jail, and on his appointment received written instructions, in
which nothing was said about the receipt of money. His duty was
to keep an account of sales and make out bills of parcels and
receipts. The governor usually received the money, but in his
absence the defendant sometimes did. In such case, the course
of business was to enter the receipt on the same day and hand the
money to the governor. It was held that he might 'be convicted
of embezzling this money, as the money of the justices.. JERVIS,
0. J., said: "If he was! de facto employed to receive money, it
does not matter whether the rules or instructions defined the employment or not." So it may be said here, that if defendant was
de facto employed to receive this money, it matters not to him
whether the ordinances prescribed that as his duty or not. He
may not enter into the employment, and then deny its terms or
responsibilities. He is estopped from saying that this money,
which he embezzled, is not the money of the city.
We see nothing in the rulings of the District Court materially
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prejudicial to the rights of defendant, and therefore the judgment
must be affirmed.
It has been remarked by a learned Ga. 500 (1854); State v. Anderson,
judge, in relation to the disqualification 5 Harr. (Del.) 493, (1854). And in
of jurors by reason of the formation or State v. Allen, 46 Conn. 531, 546,
expression of opinions, concerning the stress is laid upon the fact that the opinguilt or innocence of the accused, that ion of the juror had been "declared."
"upon no one question of civil or criminal The case in Alabama, was one in which
practice have the decisions of courts the opinion was based on rumor, but the
been mor inharmonious, than upon this decision seemed to turn upon the hact
question of qualification or disqualifi- that it had never been expressed. In
cation of jurors, arising from the for- Hudgins v. State, supra; the court said
mation or expression of opinion of the that "the weight of authority is that a
guilt or innocence of the accused :" Peo- juror is not disqualified unless lie has
ple v. Rcynelds, 16 Cal. 128, 132. And expressed as well as formed an opinion in
in another case it has been said, that to the case." These decisions rest upon
attempt to harmonize cases and deduce a the probable bias which the expression
uniform rule therefrom, would be an of an opinion is deemed likely to produce.
"almost interminable task," adding that And it seems to be regarded as immate"the decisions of scarcely any one state rial that the juror thinks that he can try
are reconcilable with each other, and the the case impartially. In State v. Clark,
mind would be lost in bewilderment supra, the juror declared on his voir dire
at the threshold of the attempt," and that he had no opinion in relation to
upon this subject "our jurisprudence is the prisoner's guilt or innocence, and
launched upon a sea of chaos:" Roeths-thought that he dould try the case fairly
cdild v. State, 7 Texas Court of Appeals and impartially. But he was held incompetent as he had previously ex542.
pressed an opinion. The court held
of
We, therefore, have no intention
attempting to reconcile cases which are that it was entirely immaterial that he
unquestionably irreconcilable, nor of de- thought lie could try the case fairly, and
ducing a uniform rule which should said that as soon as it appeared that a
govern all cases. All that we can hope juror had expressed an opinion, it folto do is to present the different theories lowed at once as a matter of law, that lie
which are held upon the subject, as we was incompetent. But in State v. Hayden, 51 Verm. 307 (1878), the Vennont
find them illustrated by the cases.
court places itself more nearly in harthat
cases
few
a
in
held
been
has
It
I.
the formation of an opinion of the guilt mony with the current authorities by deor innocence of the accused will not dis- claring that the opinion, the expression
qualify a person from acting as a juror, of which disqualifies, "must be an ununless he lies given expression to that qualified one, and based upon something
3 Yerm. more substantial than mere rumor."
eood,
opinion: Boardinan v.
II. On the other hand, it is held that
42 Id.
Clark,
v.
570 (1831); State
forming of a decided opinion is suf629 (1870) ; Sate v. Pliair, 48 Id. 366 the
to disqualify a juror, although lie
ficient
480
Id.
50
Tatro,
v.
(1875); State
People v.
(1878); State v. Mlorea, 2 Ala. 275 has not given it expression:
(1839).
542
509,
Wend.
21
Rathbun,
(Ga.)
Kelly
2
State,
v.
(1841); Hudgins
multiply author173, 180 (1847) ; Grffin v. State, 15 But it is not necessary to
point, as it will sufficiently
Ga. 476. See also Barker v. State, 15 ities upon this
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formed and expressed an opinion as to
appear hereafter that the rule so long
the fact of the killing, but not as to the
anwas
which
and
Vermont,
in
held
guilt of the defendant. And in Elbin v.
nounced at an early day in Georgia and
Wilson, 33 Md. 135 (1870), it is said
Alabama, is not upheld by the current
that the opinion must be one that goes to
authorities.
the merits. In Dew v. McDivitt, 31
III. It is held that the formation or
Ohio St. 139 (1876), it has been said
expression of a settled opinion as to the
where a juror has formed or expressguilt or innocence of an accused, will that
opinion in relation to a portion of
an
ed
Stress
render a juror incompetent.
embraced in issue, but not upon
facts
the
being laid not upon the fact that the
issue, and he otherwise stands
whole
the
opinion has been expressed, but upon the
the allowance or refusal of a
indifferent,
fact that the opinion which is entertained
discretionary. See Ogle v.
is
challenge
is of afixed and settdedcharacter : Ander383 (1857). In Brown
Miss.
33
State,
son v. State, 14 Ga. 709 (1854); Mad424 (1879), it was
Miss.
57
State,
v.
dox v. State, 32 Ga. 581 (1861); Boon
a juror had a clear
whenever
that
held
v. State, 1 Kelly 619 (1846) ; Cancemi
and opinion upon
conviction
settled
and
Ex
v. People, 16 N. Y. 501 (1858);
which was so connected with the
fact
a
parte Vermiiyea, 6 Cowen 555 (1826);
main fact in issue, that it would be diffiJackson v. Commonwealth, .23 Gratt.
cult to disbelieve the co-existence of the
(Va.) 927 (1873) ; Brakefiedv. State, 1
main fact which is usually associated with
4
NeState,
v.
Curry
;
(1853)
215
Sneed
the fact believed, he should be held inbraska 551 (1875) ; Trimnle v. Sate, 2
competent. In that case the prisoner
C.
N.
80
Jones,
v.
State
G. Greene 404;
was on trial for perjury in testifying to a
415 (1879). In Comnwnowealth v. Webfalse alibi on the trial of one W. for
ster, 5 Cush. 297 (1850), Chief Justice
arson. The juror had stated that be haa
Siuw said: "the opinion or judgment
not formed or expressed any opinion as
must be something more than -a vague
to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner,
conimpression formed from casual
but had formed a decided opinion as to
v;rsations with othersi or from reading
the guilt or innocence of W., on whose
renewspaper
imperfect, abbreviated
trial for arson the alleged perjury was
ports. It must be such an opinion upon
committed. He was held disqualified to
be
would
as
question,
the
of
the meTits
serve as juror.
likely to bias or prevent a candid judgIV. In a few cases it has been held
mei.t upon a full hearing of the evithe formation and expression of an
that
dence." And in State v. Crawford, 11
unless made
Kans. 42, it is said that impressions not * opinion will not disqualify,
to imply
as
circumstances
such
under
disnot
amounting to an opinion will
malice or ill-will against the prisoner.
qualify.
supposed that an opinion
1. The opinion to disqualify must be I"It has been
upon newspaper reports
founded
guilt
of
one which the juror entertains at his
or personal knowl.
information,
other
or
not
does
opinion
voir dire, a renounced
from being i
man
a
disqualifies
edge,
s
disqualify: Rothschild v. State, 7 Texas
not so. * * * A declais
this
But
juror.
Grissom
;
(1880)
520
Appeals
Court of
a juror,
v. State, 8 Id. 386 (1880) ; People v. ration of opinion to disqualify
be such an one as implies
must
therefore,
(1827).
369
Cowen
7
Vermilyea,
against the prisoner,
2. The opinion should be one upon the malice or ill-will
that the person chalshowing
thereby
particula3
some
upon
not
and
merits,
lenged does not stand indifferent between
features of the case. In -&atev. 7,onmp
the state and him:" State v.- Spener,
son, 9 Iowa 188 (1859) ; a juror we.,
21 N. J,196 (1846) ; Sate v. Fox, 25 Id.
hae
who
said not to be dfsqualified,
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566 (1856). These cases rest upon the
rule as stated at an early day by Hawkins to the effect that if the opinion was
not expressed from. any ill-will to the
party it was no cause of challenge: 2
Hawk. P. C. C. 43, 28, and see King
v. Edmonds, 4 B. & A. 470. But this
is not the rule in this country, although
it is recognised by the courts of New
Jersey. The courts of other states prefer to follow the rule announced by
Chief Justice MARSHALL in Burr's case,
when he said: "Light impressions,
which maybe supposed to yield to the
testimony that may be offered, which
may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute
no sufficient objection to a juror; but
that those strong and deep impressions
which will close the mind against the
testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute
a sufficient objection to him:" 1 Burr's
Trial 416. See Ex parte Vernilyea, 6
Cowen 555, 563 ; People v. Vermilyea, 7
Id. 108; Snith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 76 ;
as well as the cases cited in the sectiox
next preceding this.
V. It seems to be generally admitted
that if the opinion which the juror entertains is merely hypothetical, being based
on rumors, he is not thereby disqualified.
In Peoplev. Beynolds, 16 Cal. 128, 133,
the court say: "The mere fact that a
person hears or reads a statement, especially an ex parte statement does not imply
that he believes it, or recognises it as true,
although he may draw an inference from
it which may amount to an opinion; but
if this inference or opinion be conditional
or qualified, for example, if it depends
upon the facts turning out as stated in
the account read or heard, this would not
as a matter of law, disqualify the juror
on exception for implied bias."
In Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 76 (1841),
a juror was held competent who stated
that he had formed and expressed an
opinion based upon the rumors which he

had heard, and that he still entertained
the same opinion, if the rumors were
true. The court laid down the rule as
follows : "If a juror has made up a decided opinion on the merits of the case,
either from a personal knowledge of the
facts, from the statements of witnesses,
from the relations of the parties, or either
of them, or from rumor, and that opinion is positive, and not hypothetical, and
such will probably prevent him from giving an impartial verdict, the challenge
should be allowed. If the opinion be
merely of a light and transient character,
sue] as is usually formed by persons in
every community, upon hearing a current
report, and which may be changed by
the relation of the next person met with,
and which does not show a conviction of
the mind, and a fixed conclusion thereon,
or if it be hypothetical, the challenge
ought not to be allowed."
This rule was followed in Gardner v.
The People, 3 Scam. 83, decided at the
same term, and where the juror had expressed an opinion by saying: "If the
reports are true, my opinion is so and
so." And in Baxter v. People, 3 Gilm.
368, 378 (1846), where the juror had
formed and expressed an opinion from
reports or rumors on the hypothesis that
they were true, but who had no opinion
as to whether the rumors were true or
false, and whose opinion was not of a
fixed and definite character. The same
doctrine was adhered to in Leach v. M
People, 53 Ill. 316 (1870).
In Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615, 636
(1852), the doctrine is asserted that a
hypothetical opinion based on rumor is
not a disqualification. So, too, in Mercer v. State, 17 Ga. 146 (18555, where
the juror had said in reference to the
rumor concerning the prisoner "if that
were so he ought to be hung." Also in
Wright v. State, 18 Ga. 383 (1855),
where the juror had stated that if what
he had heard should prove true, the prisoner ought to be hung. In State v.
Kingsbury, 58 Me. 245 (1870), the court
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partial verdict, one not affected by the
opinion he then held.
And in Burk v. State, 27 Ind. 430, a
juror was held competent, who, when interrogated at his roir dire, answered that
he had formed an opinion of detendaut'guilt, if what he had heard, was true.
So in loirmeley v. Commonwealth, 10
Gratt. (Va.) 658 (1853), a juror was
regarded as qualified who entertained a
hypothetical opinion, which he stated it
would require evidence to remove. While
in Alfred v.-State, 2.Swan (Tern.) 581
(1853), a juror stated that "lie had
heard that Peck's negroes had killed him,
if the evidence turned out dillrently,
that he believed it, and could not do
his former opinion would not influence
otherwise, as he had tle evidence of the
Stew.
his verdict: State v. Williams, 3
country, that his opinion was based oi.
In Carson v. Stdte, 50
454 (1831).
rumor, but that his mind was biase(
qualheld
Ala. 134 (1873), a juror was
thereby.'" He was held not to be d;sfled who stated that he believed defendqualified. This appears to be going furbut
heard,
alit guilty from what lie had
ther than. the previous cases, for the
if the evidence should show him to be
evidently had something more tran
juror
innocent, his be;ef would not bias his
1hvpothetical opinion, although it
a
mere
verdict. In Mal - .State, 51 Ala. 9
was one based upon rumor. And it
(1874), a juror was reld competent who
seems that there are cases which hold
had an opinion based on rumor, and who
that where the opinion is founded upon
stated that "from what he had heard he
rumors, that -the juror shall not be disdid not know whether he could give the
qualified thereby. Such %as, the ruling
defendant or the state justice, but supin Thompsonr v. State, 24 Ga. 297 (1858),
In California a juror
posed lie could."
where the opinion was based, on rumor,
was held competent whole opinion was
but did not otherwise-appear to have
no
had
he
said
he
based on rumors which
been hypothetical. So in Westmoreland
reason to disbelieve, saying that "if the
v. State; 45 Ga. 225 (1§72), although
was
opinion
his
fact; turned out the same,
in this case the juror disclaimed having
formed :" People v. Williams, 17 Cal.
any prejudice or bias against the prisoner.
8
Mosher,
v.
In Durrdl
142 (1860).
See also Jim v. State, 15 Ga. 544 (1854).
Johns. 445 (1811), a juror was held
In Louisiana it is said that an opinion
reports
the
if
that
stated
who
competent
predicated upon rumor. when there is no
of the neighbors were correct, the defendbias or prejudice in the mind of the
was
plaintiff
the
and
wrong
was
ant
juror is not a disqualification :" State v.
Wglile in Thomas v. People, 67
right.
Bunger, 14 La. Ann. 462 (1859);
N. Y. 218 (1876), a juror was held
State v. Williams, 29 La. Ann. 646,
qualified who had formed and expressed
(1877). In Tennessee the-rule is firmly
an opinion based on rumor, upon the
established in accordance with the rule

say that "a conditional, contingent, hy-

pothetical, indeterminate, floating, indefinite, uncertain opinion," will not render
a jdrorincompetent. The saie doctrine
is asserted in Sat v. State, 13 S. & M.
189, 194 (1849), and in Lee v. ,State,
45 Miss. 118 (1871).
In Alabama, a juror was held competent who had formed a hypothetical opinion based on rinnors which lie believed to
be true, saying, " if the report was trte
the prisoner ought to be hung, and that
lie still tiought so if the report was
On his voir dire he declared that
true."

supposrtron that the rumor was true, saying that he believed the rumor to be
true, and that it would take evidence to
change his opinion, that he would not go
into the jury box entirely unbiased, but
that he thought he could render an im-

laid down in Alfred v. State, stpra, that

the opinions of a juror,, founded on
rumor, will not disqualify him: Magor
v. State, 4 Sneed 598 ; Moses v. State,
11 Hum. 232. In Indiana it has been
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held, where the opinion of the juror was
founded on rumor, there being no evidence that it proceded from ill-will to the
accused, or that it was so firmly settled
as to justify a belief that the juror would
not do the defendant justice, that a challenge could not be sustained: McGregg
v. State, 4 Blackf. 101; Van Vacter v,
McKillip, 7 Id. 578. And in Texas a
juror was held to be not disqualified, who
entertained an opinion based on rumor,
and which it required evidence to remove:
Thomas v. State, 36 Texas 315 ; Tooney
v. State, 8 Texas Court of Appeals
452. All these cases may be brought
into harmony with the foregoing cases
cited as holding that hypothetical opinions
are no disqualification, if the presumption
may be indulged that all opinions founded upon rumor are to be regarded as
przmdfacie hypothetical. In Virginia it
has been held in numerous cases that an
opinion founded on rumor is primd
facie hypothetical. The presumption does
not seem to us to be an unreasonable.
one, as all opinions which have no other
basis than rumor must be formed upon
the assumption that the rumor is true.
Assuming that the facts are as represented, then such and such a conclusion
follows. An opinion so formed is far
more likely to be contingent and hypothetical than settled and determined.
See Armi'stead's Case, 11 Leigh 657 ;
Epes's Case, 5 Gratt. 676, 681 ; Jackson
v. Commonwealth, 23 Id. 919, 928.
In addition to the cases already cited,
as holding jurors not disqualified by reason of hypothetical opinions entertained
by them, see Irvine v. Lumbermen'sBank,
2 W. & S. 202 ; Osiander v. Commonwealth, 3 Leigh 780; Mann v. Glover,
14 N. J. Law 195, 201 ; State v. Spencer, 21 Id. 198 ; State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa
380 ; State v. Ostrander, 18 Id. 451 ;
Palmer v. People, 4 Neb. 75 ; Collins v.
People, 48 Ill. 146.
V1I. Opinions derived from newspaper
statements in relation to the case are not a
disqualification, provided they are such
Vor XXIX.-16

as will readily yield to the evidence
which may be adduced on the trial, and
it appears that the juror can give the defendant a fair and impartial trial. This
may now be accepted as the general rule,
notwithstanding a few opinions to the
contrary.
In the unreported case of Coleman v.
Hagerman, cited in 6 Cowen 564, 565,
and in 4 Wend. 243, 244, a juror was
rejected for having expressed an opinion
founded on newspaper publications,
although he stated at his voir dire, that
he had no bias or partiality. And in
People v. iather, 4 Wend. 229 (1830),
a juror was rejected as being disqualified,
who stated that he entertained no fixed
opinion upon the subject of the defendant's guilt, but that he had an impression derived from the newspapers, and
that if the evidence supported what he
had read he had a fixed opinion, but
that if those circumstances should not
be proved, he should not consider the
accused guilty. "We are asked in this
case," said the court, "to distinguish
between an opinion formed by being an
eye-witness of a transaction, or by hearing the testimony of those who were such
witnesses, and an opinion founded on
rumors, reports and newspaper publications, and to say the former shall be evidence of partiality and the latter not.
If any distinction is to be made, Ishould
be inclinedto adopt the reverse of that contendedfor at bar." In Commonwealth v.
Knapp, 9 Pick. 496 (1830), a challenge
for cause was sustained where a juror
admitted having a prejudice against the
prisoner from what he had read in the
papers, but said that he had no definite
opinion as to his innocence or guilt, and
that he would be governed by the evidence. But a much more liberal view
now prevails, as it was found next to
impossible to secure an intelligent jury
if every man was to be excluded who
had formed an opinion from what he had
read in the newspapers. The absurdity
of the old rule was well illustrated in the
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trial of the persons engaged in the
"Anti-rent"
agitation in New York.
The court sat ten to tvelve hours a day
.for two weeks, endeavoring to obtain a
jury. Six thousand jurors were summoned, four thousand were challenged,
and only ten were found qualified. All
effort to obtain a jury was then abandoned, and a change of venire was had.
This state of things was a necessary consequence of the rule which the New York
court had laid down in People v. Bodine,
1 Denio 281 (1845), and which excluded
every one having any opinion upon the
matter in controversy.
In Staup v. Conmmonmealth, 74 Penn.
St. 458 (1873), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania laid down the rule as follows: " Where the opinions or impressions of the juror are founded on rumor
or reports, or even newspaper statements,
which the juror feels conscious lie can
dismiss; where he has no fixed belief or
prejudice, and is able to say he can fairly
try the prisoner on the evidence, freed
from the influence of such opinion or
impressions, he ought not to be excluded :" In O'Mara v. Commonwealth,
75 Penn. St. 424 (1874), the same
court held a juror competent who hafi
formed an opinion from newspapers,
which opinion would follow him into the
jury box, but who declared that he had
not formed such an opinion as would influence him in rendering a verdict unless
the evidence sustained it. In Ortwein v.
Commonwealth, 76 Penn. St. 414 (1874),
the juror had formed an opinion which
he stated would require evidence to remove, his opinion being formed from
what he had read in the newspapers.
He was held not disqualified, the court
saying "that evidence would be required
to change their first impressions has but
little weight. Such must always be the
fact, even in the case of slight impressions or loose opinions." The inquiry
must turn upon the character of the opinion. "Is it a prejudgment of the case ?
Hlas it such fixedness and strength as will

probably influence and control the juror's
verdict, or has it been formed upon the
same evidence substantially as will be
given upon the trial?" Again in Curley v. Conmonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 151
(1877) ; a juror was held competent who
had formed an opinion from what he ]lad
read, but who did not think his opinion
so fixed and determined that he would
not be governed by the evidence and who
felt sure it would not prejudice the prisoner.
.In State v. Wilson, 38 Conn. 126
(1871), a juror was held qualified who
had formed an opinion from what lie had
read in the newspapers; who believed
what lie had read, and still entertained
his opinion so formed, as he had seen no
occasion to change it, but who stated that
his opinion would yield to evidence, and
who thought he could try the case impartially, but would not say positively that
he could do so. "If he is free from
partiality or prejudice derived from any
other source, his opinion is, as a matter
of course, hypothetical, not fixed or setfled in tie sense in which those terms are
used, when used correctly in the law.
All men take newspaper statements as
current news, liable to qualification, explanation or contradiction, and when
qualified, explained or contradicted they
change their opinions or belief, accordingly, as matter of course."3 See also
State v. Potter, 18 Conn. 166.
In State v. Lawrence, 38 Iowa 54
(1873), a juror was held competent who
had read the newspaper accounts of the
murder, and who believed that it had been
committed by the prisoner, stating that
it would take some evidence or explanation to remove that opinion from his
mind, but that he thought that he could
try the case impartially. A juror was
held competent under very similar circumstances in State v. Bruce, 48 Iowa
530 (1878), the court saying, " That an'
opinion, however strong it may be,
founded upon newspaper reports, or
other hearsay evidence, will prevent a
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juror from rendering an impartial verdict, we do not believe. Alen of sufficient
intelligence and capacity to properly
discharge the duties of jurors, can certainly divest their minds of any opinion
founded upon hearsay, and determine the
guilt or innocence of the accusee upon
the evidence produced upon the trial, and
on that alone. It would be a reproach
upon the administration of justice to require jurors to be selected from that class
of persons who do not or cannot read
the current events of the day, and are
totally ignorant of what is transpiring
around them, or from that other class, if
such there be, who, having read, have no
opinion upon the subjects about which
they read."
In Pender v. People, 18 Hun 560,
(1879), the Supreme Court of New
York held a juror competent who had
read the newspaper account of the crime,
and who had formed therefrom an opinion which it would require evidence to
remove, but who declared that it would
not influence his verdict which he believed
he could render impartially. In .Balbo
v. People, 19 Hun 424 (1879), the same
-court held a juror not disqualified who
had formed an opinion from newspaper reading, which he supposed he still
entertained, but who said that he did not
think it would prevent him from acting
impartially and that his verdict would
not be biased by it. So in Cox v. People, 19 Hun 430, a juror was considered
qualified who had read of the case in the
newspapers and formed therefrom a decided opininn, which it would require
evidence to remove, saying that he would
enter the jury box with the opinion still
existing, but that he thought that he
would be governed in his verdict by the
evidence which should be introduced,
adding that his opinion was based on the
supposition that what he had read was
true, but that he did not know whether
it was true or false.
It has been held in Indiana, that a
juror was not incompetent by reason of
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a previously formed opinion, prtided it
would not require either more or less
evidence to satisfy the mind of the existence or non-existence of the material
facts involved. See Fahnestock v. State,
23 Ind. 231 ; Morgan v. State, 31 Id.
193; Clemv. State, 33 Id. 418; Cluck
v. State, 40 Id. 263; Hart v. State, 57
Id. 102. In Guetig v. State, 66 Ind.
94 (1879), a juror was held qualified
whose opinion it would require evidence
to change, but who stated that it would
readily yield to evidence. The Supreme
Court of Mlichigan, in Ulrich v. People,
39 Mich. 245 (1878), declared that a
juror was not disqualified by having
formed an opinion from reading the
newspapers, although it would take evidence to remove it, it not being of a
fixed character. While, in Illinois, in
a recent case, it is said that the fact that
it requires some evidence to remove such
an opinion will not disqualify the juror
if he thinks he can give a fair and impartial verdict: Wilson v. People, 94 I1.
299 (1880). In State v. Pike, 49 N. H.
399 (1870), the juror had read the
reports in the newspapers, and derived
an impression of the guilt of the accused,
but thought his opinion would not bias
his verdict. He was held competent.
In Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St. 328
(1865), a juror is said to be competent,
notwithstanding the formation of an
opinion from the reading of newspapers,
provided the court is satisfied he will
render an impartial verdict. See, too,
.FRazieri State, 23 Ohio St. 551.
In the particular case, none of the
jurors appear to have had any opinion
as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused; but it is plain that even had
they entertained an opinion that the
accused was guilty of the crime alleged,
they would not thereby have necessarily
been disqualified from serving as jurors
upon the trial of the case. The jurors in
the particular case simply had an opinion
that public money was either lost or
stolen. To have held such jurors dis-
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qualified by reason of entertaining such
opinions, would certainly have required
the court to go very much beyond what
the authorities would warrant. It would,
in effect, require the adoption of a rule
which would exclude all jurors who
believed a crime had been committed,
even though they had no opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the party who
happened to be charged with its commission. It would require even more than
this, as the jurors, in the particular case,
did not even have an opinion that a
crime had been committed, as they did
not profess to say that they believed the
money had been stolen, but only that it
had been either lost or stolen. To ask a
court to exclude jurors for such reasons,
is to ask it to adopt an unnecessarily
harsh, and a seemingly too restrictive
rule.
VII. There is a manifest distinction
to be drawn between opinions formed
from the reading of newspaper statements concerning a crime, and opinions
formed after reading the evidence as
given by witnesses upon a former trial
of the accused. It is manifest that
opinions formed from mere newspaper
rumors, must be less fixed and settled
than those formed after reading testimony of the witnesses as given upon the
trial. There has been a difference of
opinion as to whether jurors, whose
opinions had been formed in the latter
way, should be held to be disqualified or
not.
In helps v. People, 72 N. Y. 334
(1878), a juror was held qualified who
had read an account of the previous
trial, as given in the newspapers, and
had formed and expressed an opinion
thereon, which he still entertained, and
who stated that he thought that the
opinion would, in a measure, bias his
mind, but did not think it would prejudice his verdict. But in Greenfield v.
People, 74 N. Y. 277 (1878), the same
court expressed itself as follows: "We
are of the mind, that one who has formed

an opinion or impression from the reading or report, partial or complete of the
criminatory testimony against a prisoner,
on a former trial, however strong his
belief and purpose that he will decide
the case on the evidence to be adduced
before him as a juror, and will give an
impartial verdict thereon, unbiased and
uninfluenced by that impression, cannot
be readily received as a juror indifferent
towards the prisoner and wholly uncommitted."
A juror, whose opinion had
been formed as above stated, was rejected.
In Black v. State, 42 Texas 377
(1875), a juror was held incompetent
who had read the testimony in the case
of one jointly indicted with the prisoner,
and had formed an opinion as to the
guilt of the accused, which it would
require other and different testimony to
change, but who thought that his opinion
would not influence his verdict in the
slightest degree, nor prevent him from
giving the accused a fair trial. But in
Grissom v. State, 4 Texas Court of Appeals 384 (1878), a juror was held competent who had formed an opinion from
reading the evidence given upon the
former trial of the accused, and who
stated that if the evidence given on the
second trial should turn out to be the
same as that given on the former trial,
his opinion would be the same. He
added, that he did not think his opinion
would prevent him from giving the
accused a fair trial. And in Guetig v.
State, 66 Ind. 94 (1879), a juror was
regarded as qualified who had read the
evidence given on the former trial, and
had formed and expressed an opinion
thereon which it would require evidence
to change, saying, however, that his
opinion would readily yield to the evidence. But we find the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, saying, in Staup v.
Commonwealth, 74 Penn. St. 458 (1873),
that, "Whenever, therefore, the opinion
of the juror has been formed upon the
evidence given in the trial at aformer time,
or has been so deliberately entertained
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that it has become a fixed belief of the
prisoner's guilt, it would be wrong to
receive him. In such a case the bias must
be too strong to be easily shaken off,
and the prisoner ought not to be subjected to the chance of conviction it
necessarily begets." And in Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 23 Gratt. (Va.) 927, 928
(1873), it is said, that "if a venireman has formed an opinion as to guilt or
innocence of the accused from having
heard the evidence on a former trial or
examination of the case, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to regard
such opinion otherwise than as decided
or substantial within the meaning of the
rule; and he would generally, if not
always, be considered an incompetent
juror, even though he might think and
say he could give the accused an impartial trial." But the court, in the above
case, held a juror competent who had
formed and expressed an opinion, based
upon what certain persons had told him
was the evidence given at the coroner's
inquest, but whose opinion was not a
decided one, and who believed he could
render an impartial verdict. And in
Smith v. Commonwealth, 7 Gratt. 593
(1850), the doctrine was announced,
that it was not a valid objection to a
juror that he entertained a decided
opinion of the prisoner's guilt, formed
from reading the testimony upon a
former trial, provided, he thinks it
would not influence his judgment, and
that he could give the prisoner a fair
trial according to the evidence as submitted. In Ohio, a juror is incompetent
who nbs formed an opinion on reading
reports of the testimony of the witnesses,
being excluded by statutory provisions.
See R-azier v. Srtate, 23 Ohio St. 551.
But the authorities are so divided that
the question must be regarded as an
open one.

VIII. It is evident, from the foregoing cases, that the courts, except in
Vermont, and perhaps in one or two
other states, do not attach importance to
the fact that the juror has expressed an
opinion. If an opinion has been expressed, the courts look to the nature of
the opinion and to the basis of it, and
if the opinion is not so fixed and settled
as to prevent a fair and impartial trial,
the juror is held to be qualitied. And,
in determining this question, the juror's
opinion that he can do equal and exact
justice, and that the opinion which he
entertains will not bias his judgment,
cannot be accepted as conclusive of the
fact. It is impossible for a person
always to know what effect Iis opinions
may have in influencing his judgment.
He may be entirely honest and sincere in
the belief that his judgment will not be
biased in the least, and yet wholly
unknown to himself, he may be very
largely influenced by preconceived opinions. See Roths hild v. State, 7 Texas
Court of Appeals 544 ; Peoplev. Mather,
4 Wend. 229; People v. Gehr, 8 Cal.
359; Armistead v. Commonwealth. 11
Leigh 657; Staup v. Commonwealth, 74
Penn. St. 458 ; Cotton v. State, 31 Miss.
504.
The length of this note precludes the
consideration of disqualifications growing out of opinions based upon conversations with the parties, the witnesses,
or the jurors who served upon the former
trial of the accused. But see State v.
Ward, 14 La. Ann. 673; Quesenberry
v. State, 3 Stew. & P. 308; Logan v.
State, 50 Miss. 269; Ned v. State, 7
Porter (Ala.) 187 ; Ndms v. State, 13
S. & M. 500; Sam v. State, 13 Id.
189; Shields v. State, 8 Texas Court
of Appeals 427; Thomson v. People,
24111. 61.
Hzur WAiD ROGER8.
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In a suit against a railway for injury to a passenger, when the defence is contributory negligence the question for the jury is whether the plaintiff himself so far
contributed by his own negligence that but for such negligence on his part the injury
would not have been suflered.
Tifs rule applies as well when the negligence of the plaintiff exposes him to t,
injury as when it co-operates in causing the misfortune from which the injury results
When a passenger voluntarily occupied a position on the train more dangerous
than the one he should have occupied, the nature of the accident causing the injury
is to be considered, and if it appears that the danger of injury from that particular
accident was materially increased by the fact that he was in that particular place
instead of the place he should have occupied, he ought not to recover unless hm was
there with the consent of the conductor.
A conductor is not bound to know that a passenger is riding in the express ear,
and unless there is evidence of such knowledge the company are not liable for an
injury to the passenger on the ground that the conductor did not discover and warr
him.
Railroad companies are bound to procure and use such apparatus and appliances
as science and skill shall make known, and experience shall prove to be valuable in
diminishing the dangers of travel, provided such improvements can be procured at
an expense not greater than ought to be incurred to obtain them.
While it may not be bound to provide the very best improvement, it must
provide that which is reasonably good when compared with the best.
It would be unreasonable to require companies of small means to provide every
appliance or machine that may come into use on the great trunk lines.
The omission to use a Westinghouse air-brake, by a company which had recently
declared a dividend on a capital of $5,000,000, held, to be negligence.

Edwin Thomas was killed by a colliACTION for negligence.
sion of appellants' train with a herd of cattle straying on the track.
Plaintiff was his administratrix.
Upon the trial, it appeared that Thomas was in the employ of
the Adams Express Company, and engaged in running as messenger between Lexington and Covington. On the day of his
death, he went from Covington to Nicholasville, in charge of the
express goods on the train. In the evening he started to return to
Covington, in order to be there on the following morning to go out
again in charge of freight. On his return trip he was not on duty
as messenger, but that duty was performed by another. He paid
no fare, but under the agreement between the express company
and the railroad company, the former paid a gross sum for the
transportation of its freight and messengers.
A rule of the express company forbade any one to ride in the
express car, except the messenger on duty, and a rule of the rail-
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road company forbade conductors and baggage-masters to allow
any person to ride in baggage, mail or express cars, whose duty
does not require them to be there.
The decedent went into the express car, and was riding there
when the accident occurred. None of the passenger cars were
thrown from the track, and no one in any of them was injured.
There was plenty of room in the passenger cars. It did not
appear that the conductor knew the decedent was riding in the
express car.
There being verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.

A.

. Ward and Stevenson & O'Hlara,for appellants.

J. Q. Ward and C. W. West, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CO ER, C. J.-The most important questions in the case grow
out of the action of the court in giving and refusing instructions.
I. In the first instruction given for the plaintiff, the court told
the jury, in effect, that no fault on the part of the intestate, which
did not contribute to the wrecking of the train, would authorize a
verdict for the defendant on the ground of contributory negligence,
and refused to instruct, as asked by the defendant, that it was the
duty of the intestate to occupy a seat in one of the passenger
coaches, and that if he went voluntarily into the express car, and
it was more dangerous to ride in that car than in a passenger car,
and that his life was lost in consequence of his being in the express
car, they should find for the defendant.
That the intestate was a passenger and entitled to the privileges
and subject to the duties incident to that relation, is not disputed.
. When the defence is contributory negligence, the proper question for the jury is, whether the damage was occasioned entirely
by the negligence or improper conduct of the defendant, or whether
the plaintiff himself so far contributed to the misfortune by his
own negligence or want of ordinary or common care and caution,
that but for such negligence or want of ordinary care and caution
on his part the misfortune would not have occurred. In the first
case the plaintiff would be entitled to recover; in the latter be
would not: Railroad Co. v. Hoehl, 12 Bush 41. And this rule
applies as well when the negligence of the plaintiff exposes him to
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the injury as when it co-operates in causing the misfortune from
which the injury results: Doggett v. Railroad Co., 34 Iowa 284;
0olegrove v. Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. 492; Railroad Co. v. .Dills,
4 Bush 593; Railroad Co. v. Sickings, 5 Id. 1; ZllcAunich v.
Railroad Co., 20 Iowa 345.
When a passenger enters a railway train, he should take a seat
in a passenger coach, if there is room; and if he voluntarily goes
to a position of greater danger and is injured, the question whether
he is guilty of contributory negligence which will defeat his action
will depend upon the nature of the misfortune which resulted in
his injury: Railroad Co. v. Montgomery, 7 Ind. 474.
Contributory negligence is a defence which confesses and avoids
the plaintiff's case, and must be made out by showing affirmatively
not only that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, but that such
negligence co-operated with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury.
If a whole train be precipitate4 down an embankment, or
through a bridge into deep water, and a passenger seated in the
express car is drowned, his representative will have the same right
to recover as the representative of a passenger who was seated in a
passenger coach. There would be no pretence for saying that
because the passenger in the express car was more exposed to danger, in case of a collision with a train running in an opposite direction, than he would have been if he had been in a passenger coach,
that he ought not to recover, when it is clear that as respects the
misfortune which actually occurred, his danger was not at all
increased by the fact that he was in the express car.
So, also, of a large class of railroad disasters which result from
the giving way of the track or the breaking of some portion of a
car. These are as liable to occur at one portion of the train as at
another, and consequently a passenger is in no more danger of
injury from such accidents in the express car than in a passenger
car: O'Donnell v. Railroad Co., 59 Penn. St. 250; and the fact
that he was in that car when the accident occurred would not
defeat his right to recover, unless, perhaps, the injury should
result from some agency in that car which would not have existed
in a passenger car.
But there is another class of disasters in which the danger may
be greater in the express car than in a passenger car. Express
cars are usually in advance of passenger cars, and in case of colli-
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sion with stock or other objects on the track, or with trains running
in an opposite direction, the danger may be greater in the express
car.
The question of contributory negligence may be further affected
by other facts.
The conductor is, as to the train under his charge, the general
agent of the company, and if a passenger be invited by him to
occupy a position more dangerous than a seat in a passenger car,
and the passenger is injured while in that position, the company
could not defeat an action for the injury by a plea of contributory
negligence. In such a case the act of the conductor would be the
act of the company: Burns v. Railroad Oo., 50 Mo. 139; Clark
v. Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 135. If a conductor requires a pas
senger to occupy a dangerous position, the company would be liable
in the same manner as if it had itself given the order.
Ordinarily it is the duty of a conductor to warn a passenger
known to be occupying a dangerous position on the train, and to
request him to take a seat in the passenger car, and his failure to
do so may sometimes be equivalent to the consent of the company
that the passenger may occupy that position: 50 Mo. 139; 36 N.
Y. 135; but he is not bound at the peril of the company to know
that a passenger is in an exposed position, and unless he does
know it, the passenger has no right to complain that he was not
warned.
It is the duty of passengers to occupy the cars provided for
them, and the conductor has a right to presume that they are
doing so until he knows the contrary; and if a passenger goes
into the baggage, mail or express car without the knowledge or
consent of the conductor, he will not be permitted to urge as an
excuse for remaining there that the conductor should have discovered him and ordered him back to his seat, but failed to do so.
No one can be permitted to justify or excuse his own improper
conduct by alleging that it was the duty of another to prevent such
conduct on his part.
It seems to us, therefore, that when contributory negligence is
interposed as a defence to an action against a railroad company for
negligently injuring a passenger, and the supposed negligence consists in the fact that the passenger voluntarily occupied a position
in the train which was more dangerous than the position he should
have occupied, the nature of the accident causing the injury is to
VOL.
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satisfaction of the jury that such negligence contributed in a material degree to his injury, he could not recover.
Commenting on this instruction, AGNEW, J., said: "In

view of

the evidence, this instruction was erroneous. The plaintiff had
been riding in the baggage car twice a day for about two months.
Murphy, the conductor, himself admitted that Liston's men (of
whom O'Donnell was one) rode frequently in the baggage car
without his objecting; that he never ordered them out. When
they got on that car they generally remained without objection;
that he had no recollection of requesting them to go into the passenger car, and that he had not at any time requested the plaintiff
to leave the baggage car. * * *
"Under these circumstances it cannot be justly said of them as
of ordinary passengers, ' that any one who is possessed of sufficient
intelligence to travel should be held to know that the baggage car
is not an appropriate place for passengers,' nor to say, although
the consent of the conductor to ride there may be inferred from
these facts, yet it does not follow that the company is liable unless
it is shown that they were there at the invitation or by the direction of the conductor. * * *
"From the evidence in this case, -the jury might reasonably
conclude that O'Donnell was in the baggage car with the permission of the conductor, and for the benefit of the company, and was
rightfully there at the time of the accident."
It is evident from this language that the court did not mean to
decide that being in the baggage car would not, under any circumstances, be such contributory negligence as would defeat an action
by a passenger to recover for an injury sustained while riding in
that car. On the contrary, it seems to us clear that the court
entertained an exactly opposite opinion. After saying that the
instruction was erroneous, in view of the evidence, the learned
judge proceeds to state evidence from which the jury might have
inferred that O'Donnell was riding in the baggage car not only
with the knowledge and consent, but by. the desire of the conductor. The suggestion that the evidence showed that the plaintiff had been riding in the baggage car twice a day for two months
with the knowledge of the conductor, and without objection on his
part, shows that the court only meant to decide that the evidence
would have warranted the jury in finding that he rode there with
the consent of the conductor, and that if he did so he wa. not
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guilty of contributory negligence, and this implies that if he rode
there without such consent he was guilty.
In Dunn v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 10 Am. Law Reg. (N.
S.) 615, the only negligence alleged was that the plaintiff took
passage on a saloon car attached to a freight train, contrary to a
regulation of the company forbidding the carrying of passengers
on such trains.
The conductor knew the plaintiff was in the car before the train
started, but failed to direct him to get off, and after the train started
received fare for a first-class passage. The company was held
liable on the ground that it was the duty of the conductor to enforce
the regulation, and having failed to do so the company was bound
by his acts and omissions and became, as to the plaintiff a carrier
of passengers, and bound to the same extent as if the plaintiff had
been injured on one of its passenger trains.
In -Edgerton v. .. Y. & H. Railroad Co., 39 N. Y. 227, the
only negligence imputed to the plaintiff was that he took passage
on the caboose attached to a freight train. The case showed that
the company was in the habit of carrying passengers in that way,
and as in Dunn's Case, supra, the court held that it incurred the
same liability as if he had been a passenger on a passenger train.
In Carrollv. Railroad Co., 1 Duer 579; it appeared the plaintiff rode in the baggage car with the consent of the conductor.
L. C. & L. Railroad v. Mahoney, 7 Bush 239, was an action
under the third section of the statute for "willful" negligence, and
has no application here.
II. The plaintiff offered evidence conducing to prove that the
Westinghouse air-brake was more efficient in arresting the progress
of a train than the brakes in use on the defendant's train on which
the intestate was killed.
The defendant objected and excepted, and assigns that action of
the court as error.
Railroad companies are held to a very high degree of care and
vigilance in everything that pertains to the security of the lives
and limbs of their passengers, and are held liable for even slight
negligence on their part.
They are bound to provide a road and engines and cars, free
from all defects which endanger the lives of passengers, and which
might have been discovered by the closest and most careful scrutiny
of competent men, and to employ competent and trustworthy per-
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sons to operate and manage their roads, engines and cars, but are
not liable for casualties which human sagacity cannot foresee, and
against which the utmost prudence cannot guard.
Nor have they discharged their whole duty when they have provided the things just mentioned. They are bound to add to them
such apparatus and appliances as science and skill shall from time
to time make known, and experience shall prove to be valuable in
a considerable degree, in diminishing the dangers of railroad travel,
provided such improvements can be procured at an expense not
greater than ought to be incurred to obtain them: Taylor v. Bailway, 48 N. H. 316; Tuller v. Talbot, 23 Ills. 357; Costell, v.
Railroad Co., 65 Barb. 92; Smith v. Railroad Co., 19 N. Y. 127;
2 Redfield's Law of Railways, 187-8-9, 3d ed.; -Fordv. L. &. S.
W. Railway, 2 F. & F. 730; Meier v. Railroad Co., 64 Penn.
St. 230; Steinweg v. Railroad Co., 43 N. Y. 123; Caldwell v.
New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 Id. 282.
We have not anywhere met with a rule by which to determine,
given case, whether it is the duty of a railroad company to
in ,%
provide a designated improvement for use on its train.
It is said, in substance, in Taylor v. Railway, supra, that the
degree of care to be required is not to be measured by the revenues
of the company, "but that in fixing a general standard of care and
diligence, there should not be so much required as to render this
mode of conveyance impracticable."
The plaintiff in that case was injured in consequence of the
breaking of one of the iron rails in the track. It was shown that
the rail was much worn and battered, or broomed. The question
was whether the company had not been guilty of negligence in failing to replace it with a better one.
In such case we quite agree that the question of due care is not
to be measured by the revenues of the company. All companies
engaging in the transportation of passengers must be required to
provide a safe track and sound machinery and cars, and capable
and trustworthy operatives.
These are essential to a reasonable degree of safety, and a company unable to provide them should cease operations.
But it seems to us that it would be unreasonable to require
companies of small means and business to provide every appliance
or machine that may be found to be valuable in diminishing the
dangers of railroad travel, and which may come into general use
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on the great trunk lines, and lines connecting large cities, and
carrying a thousand passengers while others carry a hundred.
To adopt such a rule would be to drive many companies into
bankruptcy, and to render it necessary to suspend operations
altogether upon others.
ff. Railroad Co., 19 N. Y. 127, the court,
In Smith v. N. Y.
speaking of the rule which requires railroad companies to avail
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themselves of all new inventions and improvements, the utility
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We are therefore of the opinion that the evidence offered on
this conduced to prove negligence on the part of the company,
his
which contributed to the accident in which the intestate lost
life, and that it was properly admitted.
that
That we may not be misunderstood, it is proper to remark
bound
is
so
do
to
we do not intend to decide that a company able
always to provide the very best improvement that may be known
is
to practical men, but only that it must provide that which
proved
reasonably good when compared with that which has been
by proper practical tests to be the best.
Counsel also contend that the evidence was not admissible under
the pleadings. The allegation is that the accident was occasioned
of
by the negligence of the agents, officers, hands and employes
the defendant.
This was sufficient to admit evidence of every fact conducing to
prove that the disaster resulted either from the misfeasance or nonfeasance of the company, or its agents or servants.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

